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ReORIENT HISTORIOGRAPHY AND SOCIAL THEORY1  
 
Andre Gunder Frank2 
                  
           
          ORIENT: The East; lustrous, sparkling, precious; radiant, rising, nascent; 
place or exactly determine position, settle or find bearings; bring into clearly 
understood relations; direct towards; determine how one stands in relation to 
one's surroundings. Turn eastward.  
          Oxford Dictionary of Current English  
   
I. HOW WESTERN PERCEPTIONS OF THE EAST CHANGED  
Until about 1800, the predominant Western perception of the East was favorable. 
Europeans were attracted to and sought to learn from many parts of the Orient that 
were seen as civilizationally, culturally, politically, socially, economically, and 
technologically more advanced than any or all of Europe. Indeed, "Orient", as still 
recorded in The Oxford Dictionary whose first edition dates from 1911, meant what 
I just quoted in the epigraph above. What happened to make all those nice 
meanings disappear and have the American Oxford Dictionary [1980] now say 
instead: 
  
ORIENT: The East, Countries East of the Mediterranean, Especially East 
Asia. 
 
Before 1880, Europeans and Arabs at least had a much more global/ist perspective 
that was then suppressed and replaced by the rise of Eurocentric historiography and 
social theory in the nineteenth century. For instance, the Tunisian statesman and 
historian, Ibn Kaldhoun [1332-1406] evaluated and compared the "wealth of 
nations" before and at his time: 
 
This may be exemplified by the eastern regions, such as Egypt, Syria, India, 
China, and the whole northern regions, beyond the Mediterranean. When 
their civilization increased, the property of the inhabitants increased, and 
their dynasties became great.... Their prosperity and affluence cannot be fully 
described because it is so great. The same applies to the merchants from the 
                                            
1 This paper is based on a guest lecture arranged by Research Center on Development and 
International Relations 30 October 2000 at Aalborg University.  
 
2 Andre Gunder Frank is visiting Professor of International Relations, University of Miami and 
Florida International University. 
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East ... and even more so to the Far Eastern merchants from the countries of 
the non-Arab Iraq, India, and China.  (Ibn Khaldun 1967:279). 
 
Even in the eighteenth century Father Du Halde, the most learned French publicist 
of matters Chinese [who never left Paris and used Jesuit and other travelers and 
translators as sources] still wrote that in China 
 
the particular riches of every province, and the ability of transporting 
merchandise by means of rivers and canals, have rendered the empire always 
very flourishing.... The trade carried on within China is so great that of all of 
Europe is not to be compared therewith (quoted by Chaudhuri 1991:430 [for 
a longer version also see Ho 1959:199]).  
 
Lach and Kley (1965--) have written volumes [7 so far with others promised] about 
Asia in the Making of Europe. They observe for instance that "sixteenth-century 
Europeans had considered Japan and China to be the great hopes of the future" 
(ibid: 1890). By the end of the seventeenth century "few literate Europeans could 
have been completely untouched [by the image of Asia], and it would have been 
surprising indeed if its effects could not be seen in contemporary European 
literature, art, learning, and culture" (ibid:1890]).  For in the meantime, hundreds of 
books about Asia had been written, reprinted and translated in all major European 
languages. 
 
Adam Smith also recognized Asia as being economically far more advanced and 
richer than Europe in still in 1776. "The improvements in agriculture and 
manufactures seem likewise to have been of very great antiquity in the provinces of 
Bengal in the East Indies, and in some of the eastern provinces of China.... Even 
those three countries [China, Egypt and Indostan], the wealthiest, according to all 
accounts, that ever were in the world, are chiefly renowned for their superiority in 
agriculture and manufactures.... China is a much richer country than any part of 
Europe" (Smith 1937: 20,348,169).  
 
Already by the mid-nineteenth century, European views of Asia and China in 
particular had drastically changed. Dawson (1967) documents and analyzes this 
change under the revealing title The Chinese Chameleon: An Analysis of European 
Conceptions of Chinese Civilization. Europeans changed from regarding China as 
"an example and model" to calling the Chinese "a people of eternal standstill." Why 
this rather abrupt change? The coming of the industrial revolution and the 
beginnings of European colonialism in Asia had intervened to re-shape European 
minds, if not to "invent" all history, then at least to invent a false universalism 
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under European initiation and guidance. Then in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, not only was world history re-written wholesale, but "universal" social 
"science" was [new] born, not only as a European, but as a Eurocentric invention. 
In so doing, "classical" historians and social theorists of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries took a huge step backward even from European, not to mention 
Islamic, perspectives that had been much more realistically world embracing up 
through the eighteenth century. Among those who saw things from this narrower 
[European] new perspective were Marx and Weber. According to them and all of 
their many disciples to this day, the essentials of the "capitalist mode of 
production" that allegedly developed in and out of Europe were missing in "The 
Rest" of the world and could be and were supplied only through European help and 
diffusion. That is where the "Orientalist" assumptions by Marx, and many more 
studies by Weber, and the [fallacious] assertions of both and all their many 
disciples to this day about the rest of the world come in.   
 
Marx seems to have been selective in the sources he drew on to characterize "Asia" 
not to mention Africa. Marx followed Montesquieu and the Philosophes like 
Roussseau and also James Mill, who had instead "discovered" "despotism" as the 
"natural" condition and "model of government" in Asia and of "The Orient." Marx 
also remarked on "the cruelest form of state, Oriental despotism, from India to 
Russia." He also attributed to them and to the Ottomans, Persia and China, indeed 
to the whole "Orient." In all of these, Marx alleged the existence of an age-old 
"Asiatic Mode of Production" which kept all of Asia "divided into villages, each of 
which possessed a completely separate organization and formed a little world to 
itself." He alleged that in all of Asia the forces of production remained stagnant and 
stationary until the incursion of "The West" and "capitalism" woke it of its 
otherwise eternal slumber. 
 
Alas however, so is its obverse "capitalist mode of production," which was 
allegedly invented by Europeans and has ever since been held to be responsible for 
European, Western, and then global development. For as this book intends to show, 
all these were much more a function of world economic, including especially Asian 
development, than of any alleged European or "capitalist" exceptionalism, which 
have been the central themes of all social theory about "the Rise of the West" ever 
since. We will see below that all of this Marxian characterization was no more than 
a figment of his and other Eurocentric imagination, which had no foundation in 
historical reality whatsoever.  
  
Other social "scientists" may have risen to dispute Marx [and supposedly to agree 
with Smith], but they all agreed with each other and with Marx that 1492 and 1498 
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were the two greatest events in the history of mankind, because that is when 
Europe discovered the world. History and social theory have been marked ever 
since not only by the alleged uniqueness of [West] Europeans, which supposedly 
generated "The Rise of the West." What is worse, they allegedly also had to assume 
the civilizing mission of the white man's burden which bestowed "the development 
and spread of capitalism" on the world as Europe's and the West's gift to mankind. 
[Lately, some feminists have at least denied that this process has been a gift also to 
womankind]. 
 
For Max Weber of course agreed with Marx about all these European origins and 
characteristics of "capitalism," and with Sombart too. Weber only wanted to go 
them one better. Sombart had already singled out European rationality, and its 
alleged roots in Judaism, as the sine qua non of "capitalism" and its "birth" in 
Europe. Weber accepted that too. The additional acquaintance of Weber with Asian 
realities also complicated his argument and made it more sophisticated than the 
crude Marxian version. For instance, Weber recognized that Asia had big cities. 
And bureaucracies that worked. So they had to be somehow "fundamentally 
different" from European ones, both in structure and in function. 
 
So what was the essential difference, the missing ingredient that "The West" 
allegedly has and "The Rest" does not have if Weber himself did not find all these 
factors missing in the Oriental societies he studied? For Marx it was "the capitalist 
mode of production;" and Weber added also the proper religion and how it 
interfaces with the other factors to generate that "capitalist mode." Weber went to 
the trouble to study various major world religions and concluded that all of them 
had an essential mythical, mystic, magical, in a word anti-rational component, 
which "necessarily" handicapped all their true believers in coming to grasps with 
reality rationally, unlike the Europeans.  
 
This rational spirit is supposedly the missing secret ingredient that, when combined 
with all the others, distinguishes "The West" from "The Rest." Without it, the 
Asians could not possibly develop capitalism and therefore really "develop" at all, 
or even use their cities, production and commerce. Never mind that historical 
evidence belied that, from Catholics in Venice and other Italian cities to those 
gifted with the Protestant ethic in Eastern Europe and the European colonies early 
on in the South of the United States and still in the Caribbean, and elsewhere [as I 
already argued in Frank (1978b)].  
 
This Eurocentric idea consists of several strands, some of which are privileged 
more by political economists like Marx and Sombart, and others by sociologists 
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like Durkheim, Simmel, and Weber. All are summarized in the telling title The 
European Miracle by Eric L. Jones (1981). Moreover, this is only a particularly 
visible tip of the iceberg of almost all western social science and history from Marx 
and Weber, through Spengler and Toynbee, to the spate of defenses of supposed 
Western "exceptionalism" since World War II, particularly in the United States.  
 
This Eurocentrism also had nineteenth century sociological great-grandfathers in 
the "father of sociology" Auguste Compte and in Sir Henry Maine who 
distinguished between supposedly new forms of thinking and of social organization 
based on "science" and "contract," which allegedly replaced age old "traditional" 
ones. One grandfather was Emile Durkheim who idealized "organic" vs. 
"mechanical" forms of social organization and another was Ferdinand Toennis, 
who alleged a transition from traditional "Gemeinschaft" to modern "Gesellschaft." 
In a later generation, Talcott Parsons idealized "universalist" vs. "particularist" 
social forms, and Robert Redfield claimed to have found a contrast and transition 
or at least a continuum" between traditional "folk" and modern "urban" society and 
a certain symbiosis between "low" and "high civilization." The Marxist and 
contemporary neo-Marxist version is the alleged fundamental difference between 
"Asiatic," "feudal" or other forms of "tributary" modes of production on the one 
hand and the Western  "capitalist" one on the other (Wolf 1982, Amin 1991,1993, 
1996).  
 
Now we are all - knowingly or not - disciples of this completely Eurocentric social 
science and history. Talcott Parsons enshrined Weberianism and this Eurocentric 
historiography in sociology and political science when the United States became 
economically and culturally dominant in the world after World War II. His 
mistitled Structure of Social Action and The Social System as well as the derived  
"modernization theory,” and the economist W.W. Rostow's (1959) Stages of 
Economic Growth were all cut from the same Eurocentric cloth and followed the 
same theoretical pattern. Alas we may ask, what was the point? Rostow's "stages" 
were little more than a "bourgeois" version of Marx's stage by stage development 
from feudalism to capitalism to socialism -- all starting in Europe! Like Marx, 
Rostow claimed that now the United States, following England, would show the 
rest of the world the mirror of its future. Rostow (1975) also explains How it All 
Began: Origins of the Modern Economy through the scientific revolution that 
allegedly distinguished modern Europe. David Landes (1969) finds the cultural 
conditions for The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial 
Development in Western Europe only in Europe itself. Cipolla (1976:276) 
summarizes: "that the Industrial Revolution was essentially and primarily a socio-
cultural phenomenon and not a purely technical one, becomes patently obvious 
 6
when one notices that the first countries to industrialize were those which had the 
greatest cultural and social similarities to England."   
 
Other authors also offer only "internal" explanations to account for the alleged 
superiority and ascendance of the West over the rest of the world. For these writers, 
the rise of Europe was also a "miracle," which was due to allegedly unique qualities 
that Europeans had and all others lacked. Thus, White Jr. (1962), Hall (1985) or 
Baechler, Hall and Mann (1988) find the rest of the world deficient or defective in 
some crucial historical, economic, social, political, ideological, or cultural respect 
in comparison to the West. The claim is that presence in "The West" of what was 
allegedly lacking in "The Rest" gave "us" an initial internal developmental 
advantage, which "we" then diffused outward over the rest of the world as the 
"civilizing mission" of "the white man's burden."   
 
Among the worst offenders of all Eurocentrists are western economic historians, 
Marxists, and a fortiori Marxist economic historians. The vast majority of self-
styled "economic historians" totally neglect the history of most the world, and the 
remaining minority distorts it altogether. The Study of Economic History: 
Collected Inaugural Lectures 1893-1970 (Edited by N.B Harte 1971) collects 21 
such lectures by the most eminent English speaking economic historians. They in 
turn review and comment on the 'economic history' written by their colleagues in 
the profession over most of the preceding century: Almost every word is about 
Europe and the United States and their "Atlantic economy," which hardly even 
includes Africa. The rest of the world does not exist for them.  
 
Take for instance a recent review article on "Maritime Asia, 1500-1800" written by 
Wills (1993) for the American Historical Review. Wills revealingly subtitles it 
"The Interactive Emergence of European Domination." He reviews over a dozen 
books and cites perhaps one hundred others that deal with some "interaction" 
between East and West. However, most of the action reviewed remains directed 
from Europe toward Asia, and almost none the other way around. Moreover, the 
claim in the reviewer's title that European "domination emerged" already from 
1500 onwards to 1800 is not at all substantiated. Indeed, it is disconfirmed even by 
the evidence supplied by the authors that Wills himself reviews and cites. So the 
very title of his article still reflects Eurocentric prejudice far more than it describes 
reality.   
 
Also in more recent decades, the International Congress of Economic History has 
met periodically and then published its conference proceedings. Going through 
their tables of contents reveals that some ninety percent of the "international" 
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contributions are about the West. Lately, a couple of the congresses and/or volumes 
of proceedings have had titles like The Emergence of the World Economy 1500-
1914 (Fisher, McInnis & Schneider, Eds. 1986). Yet the preponderance of the 
contributions are still about the West. Another current example of the same is the 
innovative publisher Variorum. Its newest series of books is published under the 
umbrella title "An Expanding World: The European Impact on World History, 
1450-1800." The title of one of the edited volumes in this series is The European 
Opportunity. Yet the books in that series also concentrate on what Europe did, 
rather than on the opportunities in the world economy and especially in Asia, of 
which Europe only took advantage. 
 
A special Eurocentric charge is that the evidence does not support any contention 
that Europeans did anything other than by their own good efforts. Years ago, 
Bairoch (1969,1976), O'Brien (1982) and others already explicitly countered the 
earlier theses of Frank (1967, 1978) and/or Wallerstein (1974) that colonial and 
neo-colonial trade contributed to European investment and development. Bairoch 
(1969) denied that commercial capital made any significant contribution thereto. 
Patrick O'Brien (1982,1990) has on several occasions dismissed overseas trade and 
colonial exploitation as contributors to capital accumulation and industrialization in 
Europe, since by his calculations this trade, not to mention profits therefrom, 
amounted to no more than 2 percent of European GNP in the late eighteenth 
century. O'Brien (1982:18) contends that "for the economic growth of the core, the 
periphery was peripheral." O’Brien (1997: 76-77) goes even further and 
categorically contends under the sub-title "The Formation of a Global Economy, 
1846-1914" that economic "interconnections across continents and countries down 
to the middle of the nineteenth century seem limited."  
 
Marxist economic history, against whom Rostow, Bairoch, O'Brien and others also 
rail, may seem different; but it is equally, indeed even more, Eurocentric. Thus, 
Marxist economic historians also look for the sources of "The Rise of the West" 
and "the development of capitalism" within Europe. Examples are the famous 
debate in the 1950s on "the transition from feudalism to capitalism" among 
Maurice Dobb, Paul Sweezy, Kohachiro Takahashi, Rodney Hilton and others 
(reprinted in Hilton 1976) and the Brenner Debate on "European feudalism" (Aston 
and Philpin, Eds. 1985). The very existence of a world economic system was 
explicitly denied by Marx and only belatedly acknowledged by Lenin. However, 
his "imperialism" also was of recent European origin. In Rosa Luxembourg’s 
version, the "world" capitalist economy had to rely on "external non-capitalist" 
space and markets outside of the capitalist system into which to expand. As Teshale 
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Tibebu (1990: 83-85) aptly put it, all this Marxist economic history and theory is no 
more than 'Orientalism painted red." 
 
All of these "ideal type" West Yes/East diads [or triads in the case of the alleged 
Great Transformation of Karl Polanyi (1952,1957)] are idealizations of the West 
that have several things in common. The most important ones are that first they 
posit essentialist socio-cultural features and differences that are far more imaginary 
than real, and then they allege that the differences distinguish "us" from "them," or 
in the latter day terminology of Samuel Huntington  (1993,1996) separate "The 
West" from "The Rest." Indeed, allegedly these features also distinguish modern 
[Western] society from its own past as well as from other societies' often still 
lingering present. Moreover, these "ideal" types attribute some kind of pristine 
self-development to some peoples - mostly to "us" - but not to others, and their 
subsequent diffusion [when positive] or imposition [if negative] from here to there. 
"The quintessential culmination of this "tradition” was Lerner's (1958) The Passing 
of Traditional Society. In the real world, the only practical holistic choice has been  
"none of the above." 
 
II. SOME NECESSARY BUT STILL INSUFFICIENT CRITICAL BEGINNINGS 
We may group our review of the new - and necessary but not sufficient - 
historiographic and theoretical departures as those that really do examine the East, 
those that re-examine the West, those that compare East and West, and those that 
propose a step toward more holism by looking at both from the perspective of a 
'world-economy" and 'world-system,' which nonetheless remain European and 
western centered. 
 
A. The East Never Was as the West Made It Out To Be 
Historians and social scientists from Asia, Africa, and Latin America began [or 
better continued!] to re-examine these areas and their peoples. Particularly 
important work has been done by many Indians on South Asia, also by European 
on Southeast Asia, on China and more recently on Japan. In and on India, the major 
pioneers with perhaps also the broadest perspectives were Irfan Habib, for instance 
in his works on agriculture, technology and commerce in Mughal India (1963a,b, 
1969, 1980, 1990) and N.K. Chaudhuri on Trade and Civilization in India and on 
Asia Before Europe (1978, 1985, 1990). Some of the other important Indian authors 
who have 'told it as it really was' are Arasaratnam (1986, 1995), Das Gupta 
(1979,1987, 1990), Ganguli (1964), Mukerjee (1991/2, 1994,), Prakash (1983, 
1994, 1995), Subrahamanyam (1990, 1994, 1997)) and the Cambridge Economic 
History of India edited by Rayachaudhuri and Habib (1982). Some non-Indians 
who merit special mention are Barendse (1998), Bayly (1983, 1987, and 1990), 
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Perlin (1994,1995), and Stein (1998). Several Durch scholars have done pioneering 
and similar work on Southeast Asia: J.C. van Leur's Indonesian Trade and Society: 
Essays in Asian Social and Economic History was written already in the 1930s and 
republished in 1955. It was followed with a similar position by Van Schrieke 
(1955) in his Indonesian Sociological Studies and in 1956 by Wertheim's own 
Indonesian Society in Transition: A Study of Social Change. Other Dutch scholars 
like M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofsz (1962) continued this work on Indonesia in the 
world, as has in Australia especially Anthony Reid (1993). Important new work on 
Chinese economy is being done among others by Brook (1997), Marks (1997), 
Pomeranz (1997), von Glahn (1996), and Wong (1997) and on Japan by Hall 
(1991), Howe (1996), Tarling (1992) as well as by many Japanese reviewed by 
Ikeda (1996). On West Asia, other important precurseos have been Islam et 
Capitalisme by Maxime Rodinson (1972) and The Venture of Islam by Marshall 
Hodgson (1974), followed by Inalcik and Quataert (1994) and by Islamogu-Inan 
(1987). Special mention is merited by the most global but only thirteenth century 
Before European Hegemony by Janet Abu-Lughod (1989) and several surveys of 
science and technology, especially the multi-volume Science and Civilization in 
China by Needham (1954-), the analogous if less ambitious twelve-volume History 
of Science and Technology in India by Kuppuram and Kumusamani (1990) on 
India, and Nasr (1976) and al-Hassan and Hill (1986) on Islamic Science. 
 
Indeed conceptually, if not always chronologically, the first critique of the received 
wisdom is to recognize that Kipling's famous rendition that "the East is East, and 
the West is West" is no more than Western mythology to begin with. The very idea 
of and distinction between 'East' and 'West' is no more than a Western invention to 
'distinguish' itself. An important opening gun was the scathing critique of the very 
idea of Orientalism itself by Edward Said (1978]. Coming from another direction, 
another critique was my own "The Sociology of Development and the 
Underdevelopment of Sociology" (Frank 1969) and Susanne Jonas Bodenheimer's 
(1971) "Dependency and Imperialism: The Roots of Latin American 
Underdevelopment." We denied that the Third World South, then including the 
"Oriental" East, ever was 'traditional' as received theory had painted it to be. We 
and the theory of 'dependence' sought to distinguish between  'undevelopment' and 
'the underdevelopment of development,' However successful, this challenge was 
nonetheless insufficiently holistic.  
  
Another, more recent, variant are 'post-colonialism' and other variants of 'post-
modernism,' which also deny the colonially imposed 'reality,' but often at the cost 
of denying that there is any reality at all to speak of. In India, this variant has 
gained much popularity under the name of "subaltern" studies, whose limitiations 
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and confusions have been rightly analyzed in various issues of EPW, especially that 
of April 18, 1998. 
  
B. But the West Itself Never Was or Did What its Advocates Claimed Either.  
The second conceptual leg to collapse has been "The Myth of Western 
Exceptionalism." That is the telling sub-title of James Blaut (1993) in what he calls 
The Colonizer's Model of the World: Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric 
History. Blaut microscopically examines, exposes and demolishes the myth of "The 
European Miracle" in its myriad forms of biology [racial superiority and 
demographic continence]; environment [nasty-tropical Africa; arid, despotic Asia; 
temperate Europe]; exceptional rationality and freedom [as against "Oriental 
despotism", the centerpiece of the Weberian doctrine, and part of the Marxian one]; 
alleged European historical superiority in technology, despite its borrowings from 
and dependence on earlier Chinese, Indian and Islamic advances; and society 
[development of the state, significance of the Church and "the Protestant ethic," the 
role of the bourgeoisie in class formation, the nuclear family, etc].  
 
Thus, Blaut effectively demonstrates that each of these alleged European 
"exceptionalisms" and the whole "European miracle" is no more than a myth that is 
firmly based only in Eurocentric ideology. Therefore, its derived social "science" 
is empirically and theoretically untenable as well. Therefore, Blaut correctly argues 
that it is wrong to attribute the subsequent development of Europe and the West to 
any of these supposedly internal European exceptionalisms. Jack Goody (1996) 
goes over some of the same ground again for the West, and comparatively finds 
similar or functionally analogous attributes also in studies like those mentioned in 
section A above about West, South, and East Asia. Goody again effectively refutes 
especially the Weberian allegations of the alleged "uniqueness [of] specific and 
peculiar achievements of Western rationalism." Yet, "the framework of such ideas 
has been the bread and butter of sociologists, historians, demographers, economists 
and, from a somewhat different angle, anthropologists" (Goody 1996:5). Many 
monographic and analytic studies on particular aspects of Western economic 
history, of course, also show that it departed more than considerably from its 
Weberian 'ideal types'. 
 
C. Comparing East and West Illuminates Both  
Another attempt to break down this Eurocentrism is to compare 'East" and 'West' to 
show that they were never so different after all, or at least to find what differences 
there really were. Indeed, this approach already has a long history and venerable 
tradition. Weber deliberately adopted it in his comparative study of world religions, 
even if it was to end up with the European exceptionalism of "the Protestant Ethic 
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and the Spirit of Capitalism." Since then, more and more comparisons have pulled 
the historical rug out from under Weberian, Marxist, Polanyian and other 
Eurocentrism. Notable among these have been the American Marshall Hodgson 
(1974, 1993), the European Fernand Braudel (1992) and especially the Asian N.K. 
Chaudhuri (1990). Of course, the same has been an element also in the arguments 
of Blaut (1993) and Goody (1996) already cited in section B above. Rutten (1994) 
also favorably compares European and Asian capitalists. My own ReOrient: Global 
Economy in the Asian Age (1998) also makes numerous East-West comparisons of 
patterns and changes in population, production, trade, science, technology, 
institutions, etc.  
 
The book China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European 
Experience by Bin Wong (1998), because it not only pushes such comparisons 
much further but also offers them as a theoretically sufficient alternative to the 
received wisdom, which Wong rightly rejects like I do. Wong begins by observing 
that since the nineteenth century most studies on China have been guided by the 
search for what China did not have or do by European standards. Instead, he 
proposes to examine Chinese reality itself and then proceed to ask how it can shed 
new light not only on China but comparatively also on the European experience. 
Wong writes: 
 
One can find with little effort any number of differences between China and 
Europe, but assessing which of these differences mattered is difficult.... A 
foundation of commonalties would locate more sharply the arena within 
which important initial differences could be located.... Without first 
identifying a set of commonalties, however, all differences compete for 
primary attention.  The economic similarities to be considered here begin 
with Adam Smith [cited from manuscript] 
 
That is, the "Smithian dynamic" of the relation between the division of labor 
and the extent of the market was operative in China just as much as in 
Europe. So were the Ricardian ones of comparative advantage and the 
Malthusian demographic ones. Wong, like Pomeranz (1997) and alas only 
much more superficially Frank (1998), also shows that per capita incomes, 
standards of living and death rates were quite comparable. Moreover, Wong 
observes as we also did in Sections A and B above, that most of the alleged 
cultural, social, and political differences either did not exist in reality or that 
their supposed differential effects on the observed differences in European 
and Chinese developments after 1800 are very dubious. Therefore he 
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suggests that "other differences can then be introduced to explore further the 
distinctive paths followed by different parts of Eurasia" (Wong 1998). 
                        
So far, so good. This kind of more careful discrimination between real 
commonalties and alleged and real differences in 'causes' may indeed be necessary 
to account for differences in 'effects.' But is or indeed can that scientific procedure 
be theoretically and empirically sufficient to account for the differential effects that 
we observe. My answer is that NO, it can NOT.  
 
For even more important however, what emerges from our review of early modern 
world economic history is that many of the specific "differences" are themselves 
generated by structured interaction in a common world economy/system. Far from 
being appropriate or necessary to understand this or that specificity here or there, 
differentiation then becomes an obstacle to accounting for and comprehending it. 
All attempts to account for features and factors of "development" on the basis only 
or even primarily of local antecedents and in the absence of their world economic 
"function" can result only in the neglect of factors that are essential to any 
satisfactory explanation. Only a holistic perspective on and from the global whole 
that is more than the sum of its parts can offer any adequate comprehension of any 
part and how and why it differs from any other!   
  
Therefore, all studies that compare "Western" and "Oriental” societies are already 
vitiated by their choice of the features or factors to be compared, which is itself 
derived from focusing on a part, be that Britain, Europe, the West or wherever. 
Indeed, van Leur (1955: 19) already wrote in his Indonesian Trade and Society that 
"justice cannot be done to the economic history of other periods and areas when 
one uses the categories of Western European economic history as the point of 
departure." But that is the very design of the studies from Marx and Weber to 
Braudel and Wallerstein  et al. They all suffer from the misplaced concreteness of 
looking for the explanandum with a magnifying glass or even a microscope, but 
only under the European streetlight. The real task is first to take up a telescope to 
gain a holistic view of the global whole and its world economy/system. As the keen 
observer of India Frank Perlin rightly insists that 
 
we need to move beyond comparison in an attempt to draw broader structural 
conclusions.... We need to ask questions about the possible existence, at the 
same particular moment in 'world' history, of similar, even identical [larger 
structural] forces operating on these different types of local political 
economy .... In short, commercial manufactures in Europe and in Asia 
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formed dependent parts of wider international developments (Perlin 
1990:50,89-90). 
 
D. "Europeans Built a World Around Europe, as Historians Know."  
That is what Fernand Braudel wrote on the dustjacket of Wallerstein's (1974) The 
Modern World-System. Both sought to extend the critiques summarized in Section 
B above by looking for other sources to account for "The Rise of the West.' So does 
Jack Goody who recommends going farther and farther back through world history, 
and writes 
 
A neglect of this common history over the long term lies behind a large body 
of research in sociology, in history, in economics and in anthropology that 
has dominated Europe over the last two hundred years and takes as its 
problematic the Rise and Uniqueness of the West.... I am arguing for the 
reverse, for the necessity of looking at Developments in Europe from a wider 
perspective, of taking a global point of departure.... [Then] we find a swing 
of the pendulum with one advancing on one front at one time, another at a 
different stage.... And it is a pendular movements that continues today 
(Goody 1996:240,230,231). 
 
Alas although Goody may take a global point of departure beginning in the Bronze 
Age in his final chapter entitled "Revaluations," he does not pursue it to offer even 
the barest outlines of a global process since then and certainly not for the early 
modern period, for which he reverts to making only comparisons between Europe 
and Asia. Others who also go farther backward in history but try to do a more 
holistically global analysis are the Islamicist Marshall Hodgson's (1993) Rethinking 
History [written before his death in 1968], the Australians Graeme Snooks (1994) 
Dynamic Society and David Christian's (1994) "Case for Big History" and in the 
Netherlands Fred Spier (1996) Big History and Johan Goudsblom (1992,1996), 
although the latter's co-author Eric Jones still cannot divest himself of 
Eurocentrism regarding the early modern period. 
 
An important early attempt to go back further was The Rise of the West by William 
McNeill (1963) with which he can be said to have fathered contemporary world 
history as a field of study. He criticized Toynbee for treating world history in terms 
of twenty-one different civilizations, when McNeill suggested that there were only 
three major contributory "civilizational" streams to world history and to the rise of 
the West. So far so good. However looking back twenty-five years after the 
publication of his book, McNeill (1990:9) recognized that "the central 
methodological weakness of my book is that while it emphasizes interactions 
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across civilizational boundaries, it pays inadequate attention to the emergence of 
the ecumenical world system within which we live today... [and that the] three 
regions and their people remained in close and uninterrupted contact throughout the 
classical era" since 1500 BC, and therefore a fortiori since 1500 AD! Nonetheless 
in this modern period, McNeill still sees the driving motor force of world history in 
the West and its development. Despite his important contributions to world history 
McNeill still testifies to the difficulties in overcoming a Eurocentric perspective 
and adopting a truly global world perspective of or on the world.  
 
These same difficulties were also insuperable for Braudel and still are so for 
Wallerstein and their many disciples. Braudel's "Perspective of the World" since 
1500 is broader than most. He divided the world into a "European world-economy" 
and several other and separate external "world-economies" outside the same.  
Braudel did, of course, also study and describe at least parts of these "other" world 
economies, especially in Volume III of his trilogy on Civilization & Capitalism. 
Indeed, so did Marx in his own Volume III of Capital! Yet both neglected to 
incorporate the findings of their third volumes into the model and theory of their 
first volumes. Moreover, their neglect was quite conscious, intentional and 
deliberate: Their Eurocentrism convinced both that any and all historical model and 
social theory, be it universal or not, must be based on the experience of Europe 
alone. Their only concession was that Europe and its model did have consequences 
for the rest of the world.  
 
It was Immanuel Wallerstein's (1974) The Modern World-System [and if I may say 
so also my own simultaneously written World Accumulation and the companion 
Dependent Accumulation (Frank 1978a,b)] that sought to systematize these 
consequences of European expansion and "capitalist" development for both Europe 
and the rest of the world. Both of us emphasized the negative "underdeveloping" 
impact of European expansion in many other parts of the world and their 
contribution in turn to capital accumulation and development in Europe and then 
also in North America. However, both of us still limited our modeling and 
theoretical analysis to a modern "world" economy/system, which we saw and 
Wallerstein still sees as centered in Europe and expanding from there to incorporate 
more and more of the rest of the world in its own European based "world" 
economy. In his perspective, Europe's expansion did incorporate parts of Africa, 
the Caribbean and the Americas into the world-economy/ system. However as 
Wallerstein explicitly explains, this economy was only world-like, and not at all 
world encompassing. For in his view, West-, South-, and East- Asia, and indeed 
Russia, were only incorporated into this European world-economy/ system after 
1750. So Wallerstein's "world-system" perspective, theory and analysis not only 
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does not encompass most of the world before that. He even claims explicitly that 
most of the world, including all of Eurasia east of the Mediterranean and Eastern 
Europe played no significant part in his "world-economic/system" history.  
 
Eric Wolf (1982) is rightly critical of others' neglect of the impact of Europe [on] 
the People Without History. He shows that people outside Europe did have 
histories of their own and how the expansion of Europe impacted on them. 
However, he still underestimates their mutual impact on each other; and he does 
not ask how the one world in which all participate together impacts on each of 
them. Moreover he retains, indeed even resurrects, the primacy of "modes of 
production," from kinship, to tributary, to capitalist based ones. Thus Eric Wolf 
(1982) and Samir Amin (1991) refer to a so-called "tributary mode of production," 
which supposedly characterized the whole world before 1500 according to the 
former and much of it still until 1800 according to the latter. 
 
Little is gained in my view, and much better opportunities at global reformulation 
are needlessly squandered, by inventing new latter day variations of these old 
European derived categories with fuzzy and euphemistic prefixes that characterize 
particular 'societies' as pre, proto, semi, quasi, commercial, petty, ersatz, or even 
post 'capitalist' and 'feudal' or 'socialist' for that matter. The same must be said 
about the recent discussions about 'merchant capitalism' in Wallerstein's Review 
(XX, 2, Spring 1997).  
 
The same original Eurocentric sin is still latent if not manifest even in the most 
recent conscious efforts to transcend Eurocentrism from Janet Abu-Lughod's 
(1989) Before European Hegemony [which ends in 1350 and previews a new 
beginning in Europe] and Chaudhuri's (1990) Asia Before Europe [whose subtitle 
established Indian Ocean limits, and does not attempt an economic history even of 
that], to Blaut's (1993) The Colonizers Model of the World [who criticizes 
Eurocentrism but offers no replacement and attempts no world economic history]. 
Indeed, the alleged European origin of the  'modern capitalist world system' is still 
featured even in Arrighi's (1994) The Long Twentieth Century, Snooks' (1994) 
Was the Industrial Revolution Necessary?  and The Dynamic Society (1996), 
Sanderson's (1995) Social Transformation, Modelski & Thompson's (1996) 
Leading Sectors and World Powers, Adams' (1996) Paths of Fire, and Chase-Dunn 
& Hall's (1997) Rise and Demise. As noted in footnote 6 above, the Gulbenkian 
Commission Report on Open the Social Sciences for the twenty-first century, 
written mostly by Wallerstein (1996), also stops short of challenging the sacrosanct 
cage of the European origin and center of capitalism and all that allegedly follows.  
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Yet, as Marshall Hodgson (1993) already wrote before his untimely death in 1968   
 
a Westernist image of world history, if not disciplined by a more adequate 
perspective, can do untold harm; in fact it is now doing untold harm.... We 
must force ourselves to realize what it means to say that the West is not the 
modern world, gradually assimilating backward areas to itself;.... At least as 
important was the very existence of the vast world market, constituted by the 
Afro-Eurasian commercial network (Hodgson 1993:290, 68, 47). 
 
That is, most received economic and other history not only neglect and/or distort 
especially the Asian parts of real world [economic] history. Perhaps even more 
significant is that thereby Eurocentric history and social theory cannot even account 
for or explain the fundamentals of European and Western [economic] history itself.  
Therefore, it is useless to look for the "causes" of this rise only or even primarily 
under the Western streetlight.  
 
III. A HOLISTIC GLOBAL ALTERNATIVE  
How then did the West "rise," if there was nothing exceptional about it or its mode 
of production and it did not even entertain any hopes of hegemony before 1800? 
Instead, the entire question of "The Rise of the West" then and of the East now 
must be re-conceptualized and re-phrased in terms of the whole world 
economy/system itself and not just to any British, European, Western, and/or now 
East Asian part/s of the same. The only solution is to cut the Eurocentric Gordian 
knot and approach the whole question from a different paradigmatic perspective. 
The "Rise of the West" in Europe, therefore was not a case of pulling itself up by 
its own bootstraps nor even with the exploitation of its colonies. More properly, the 
"Rise of the West" must be seen as occurring at that time in the world 
economy/system by engaging in NIE import substitution and export promotion 
strategies to climb up on the shoulders of the Asian economies. The [cyclical?]  
decline of Asian economies and regional hegemonies, facilitated this European 
climb up, then as the subsequent renewed decline of the west facilitates the also 
renewed rise of the east now. East Asia's rise to world economic prominence makes 
it all the more urgent to focus on the long historical continuity of which both 
processes are parts. 
 
THE EARLY MODERN WORLD ECONOMY 1400-1800 
A WORLD ECONOMIC SUMMARY 
Despite all the allegations to the contrary, on the evidence there can be no 
reasonable doubt that there was a globe encircling world-wide trading system and 
division of labor long before "Europeans built a world around themselves, as 
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historians know." Janet Abu-Lughod (1989) outlined a "thirteenth century world 
system" with some "regional" patterns, which persist in the world economy through 
the eighteenth century.  She identified three major - and within each of these some 
minor - regions, in eight mutually overlapping regional ellipses that covered Afro-
Eurasia in her account of the world economy. These included regions centered - 
going from west to east - on Europe, the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Persian 
Gulf, the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal, the South China Sea, as well as Inner 
Asia.  All of these regions continued to play more or less major, but not equal, roles 
in the world economic division of labor and system of "international" trade, despite 
the addition of an Atlantic ellipse in the sixteenth century.  
 
This global economy and multilateral trade, also in Asia, was expanded through the 
infusion of American money by the Europeans. Indeed, that is what permitted 
Europeans to increase their participation in the global economy, which until and 
even through the eighteenth century remained dominated by Asian and particularly 
Chinese and Indian production, competitiveness, and trade. A number of works by 
mostly Asian historians are helping to put the Indian Ocean economy on the map, 
as its important place and role in history well merits. China was the focus of a Sino-
centric sub-system in East Asia, whose economic weight in the world has been 
grossly underestimated, even when it has been recognized at all, which itself has 
been all too rare.  
 
The work of Hamashita (1988,1994) and the proposed research by him and Arrighi 
and Selden (1996) are designed to help remedy this serious deficiency. There were 
also longstanding bilateral relations of China with Central Asia and the trilateral 
ones with Korea and Japan, and the significant roles of the coastal regions of 
China, of emporia and other ports on the South China Sea and in Southeast Asia 
and the Ryukus, and of the trading diasporas especially of "Overseas Chinese," 
which not incidentally continue to play their vital roles today. None of this global 
pattern of inter-regional division of labor and trade corresponds to the received 
image of a "modern capitalist world-economy" that began in Europe and only then 
expanded to "incorporate" one region after another elsewhere in the world until the 
West dominated them all. 
 
Instead, the international division of labor and relative sectoral productivity and 
regional competitiveness in the world economy were reflected the pattern of trade 
balances and money flows on a global scale. In the structure of the world economy, 
four major regions maintained built-in deficits of commodity trade: The Americas, 
Japan, Africa and Europe. The first two balanced their deficit by producing silver 
money for export. Africa exported gold money and slaves. Southeast Asia and 
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West Asia also produced some silver and gold money, which contributed to balance 
their trade. Unlike Europe however, they were able also to produce some other 
commodities for which there also was an export demand. Both Southeast and West 
Asia also realized "export" earnings from their respective locations at the 
southeastern and southwestern trade turntables of the central Asian economies. To 
some extent, so did Central Asia.  
 
That is in economic terms, all of these deficitary regions nonetheless also produced 
some "commodities" for which there was a demand elsewhere in the world 
economy. The fourth deficitary region, Europe, was hardly able to produce 
anything of its own for export with which to balance its perpetual trade deficit. 
Europe managed to do so primarily by "managing" the exports of the three other 
deficitary regions, from Africa to the Americas, from the Americas to Asia, and 
from Asia to Africa and the Americas. The Europeans also participated to some 
extent in trade within Asia, especially between Japan and elsewhere. This intra-
Asian "country" trade was marginal for Asia but nonetheless vital for Europe, 
which earned more from it than from its own trade with Asia. However, none of 
this European participation in world trade and the global division of labor would 
have been possible without European colonial access to American silver, of which 
more below. 
 
The two major regions that generated and export surplus and were most "central" to 
the world economy were India and China. That centrality rested primarily on their 
outstanding absolute and relative productivity in manufactures. In India, these were 
primarily its cotton textiles that dominated the world market, and to a lesser extent 
it’s silk textiles, especially in India's most productive Bengali region. Of course, 
this competitiveness in manufacturing also rested on productivity on the land and in 
transport and commerce. They supplied the inputs necessary to supply raw 
materials to industry, food to workers, and transport and trade for both, as well as 
for export and import. 
 
The other, and even more "central" economy was China. Its even greater centrality 
was based on its even greater absolute and relative productivity in industry, 
agriculture, [water] transport, and trade. China's even greater, indeed the world 
economy's greatest, productivity, competitiveness and centrality were reflected in 
its most favorable balance of trade. That was based primarily on its world 
economic export leadership in silks and ceramics and its exports also of gold and 
copper coin and later of tea. These exports in turn made China the "ultimate sink" 
of the world's silver, which flowed there to balance China's almost perpetual export 
surplus. Of course, China was only able to satisfy its insatiable "demand" for silver; 
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because it also had an inexhaustible supply of exports, which were in perpetual 
demand elsewhere in the world economy.  
 
Thus another "regionalization" of the world economy could be visualized in the 
form of concentric circles. Among these, China [and within that the Yangtze Valley 
and/or South China] would form the innermost circle. The "East Asian Tribute 
Trade System" studied by Hamashita (1988,1994) would form the next circle, 
which beyond China included at the very least parts of Central Asia, Korea, Japan, 
and Southeast Asia. Related other work on the South China Sea is that of Wang 
(1958), Blusse (1986), Klein (1989), Ikeda (1996) and Lourido (1996) and also on 
overland trade with continental Southeast Asia by Sun (1994). However, the 
boundaries of this circle were porous and uncertain, and Hamashita himself 
recognizes its extension to South Asia. That in turn of course had millenarian old 
close relations with West Asia and East Africa, as well as with Central Asia, which 
in turn became increasingly enmeshed with Russia and that with China. These 
regions could be said to form a next outer band, which we can then perhaps identify 
as an Asian, or Afro-Asian, regional circle. Europe and across the Atlantic the 
Americas would then occupy their rightful places in the outer band of the 
concentric circles, since Asia also had economic relations with Europe and through 
its mediation with the Americas. Apart from focusing on China, East Asia, and 
Asia respectively as major world economic regions, such a concentric circle 
mapping of the global economy also puts Europe and even the Atlantic economy in 
their marginal place. 
 
This Asian economic predominance also means that European the supposed 
technological 'advance' and especially its 'seventeenth century scientific revolution' 
and the latter's alleged contribution to technological innovation are pure 
Eurocentric myths (Adams 1996, Shapin 1996, Frank 1998). At least four different 
but related kinds of evidence and argument must lead us to reject the received 
wisdom's mythology about the alleged technological and institutional superiority of 
Europe over Asia before 1800. They are the evidence of technological advance and 
institutional sophistication in various parts of Asia and their comparison with 
European ones, the fact that in response to world economic relations and 
competition these technologies and institutions were widely diffused in all 
directions whenever it was profitable to do so, and the myth of the alleged 
contribution of the 'seventeenth century scientific revolution' in Europe to the 
development of technology itself. Another still more important reason that casts 
even more than doubt on the thesis of European technological superiority is 
derivative from the above observations: There was no European technology!  The 
development of technology, like all economic development, was a world economic 
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process, which took place in and because of the structure of the world 
economy/system itself. 
 
A SHORT HISTORY OF GLOBAL 'EAST'- 'WEST' RELATIONS 
The present millennium began with a period of AfroEurasian-wide political 
economic expansion around AD 1000, which was centered at its far "eastern" end 
in Song China, but it also accelerated an accentuated re-insertion of its "western" 
end in Europe, which responded by going on several Crusades to plug its marginal 
economy more effectively into the new Afro-Eurasian dynamic. A period of pan-
AfroEurasian political economic decline and even crisis followed in the late 
thirteenth and especially in the fourteenth century.  
 
Another long period of expansion began in the early fifteenth century, again in East 
and Southeast Asia. It soon included Central, South and West Asia, and after the 
mid fifteenth century also Africa and Europe. The "discovery" and then conquest of 
the Americas and the subsequent "Colombian exchange" and then European 
"Ecological Imperialism" were a direct result, and part and parcel, of this world 
economy/system wide expansion (Crosby 1972, 1986). So if there was a "new 
departure," it was the incorporation of the Americas and then also of Australasia 
into this already ongoing world historical process and then global system. 
However, not only the initiative but also the very causes and then forms of 
execution of this incorporation had been generated by the structure and dynamic of 
the AfroEurasian historical process itself. It was the renewed economic expansion 
that started in East, Southeast and South Asia in 1400 and reached Europe by 1450 
which attracted Columbus and Vasco da Gama in 1492 and 1498.  
 
For the "long sixteenth century" expansion in fact began in Asia in the early 
fifteenth century; and it continued in Asia through the seventeenth and into much of 
the eighteenth centuries. Indeed, this economic expansion was primarily Asian 
based, although it was also fuelled by the new supplies of silver and golden money 
now brought by the Europeans from the Americas. In Asia, this expansion took the 
form of rapid growth of population, production, trade including imports and 
exports, and presumably income and consumption in China, Japan, Southeast Asia, 
Central Asia, India, Persia, and the Ottoman lands. Politically, the expansion was 
manifested and/or managed by the flourishing Chinese Ming/Qing, Japanese 
Tokugawa, Indian Mughal, Persian Safavid, and Turkish Ottoman regimes. The 
European populations and economies grew more slowly than all but the last of the 
above, and they did so rather differentially among each other. So did some 
"national" and other quite multi-ethnic European states, all of which were however 
much smaller than the large ones in Asia.   
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The differentiation in productivity and competitiveness that underlay the division 
of labor and exchange were manifest in im-balances of trade and "compensated" by 
flows over long distances of mostly silver specie money. Reflecting the 
macroeconomic imbalances and also responding to corresponding microeconomic 
opportunities to make and take profit, the silver moved around the world in a 
predominantly eastward direction across the Atlantic and - via Europe - across the 
Indian Ocean, and westward across the Pacific from the Americas and Japan.  
Ultimately, the largest silver "sink" was in China, whose relatively greatest 
productivity and competitiveness acted like a magnet for the largest quantity of 
silver. However there as elsewhere, the incoming money generated increased 
effective demand and stimulated increased production and consumption and 
thereby supported population growth. The new supply of money failed to do so 
where the political economy was insufficiently flexible and expandable to permit 
growth of production to keep pace with the increase in the supply of money. In that 
case rising effective demand drove up prices in inflation, which is what happened 
in Europe.  
 
As a result, population grew much more and faster in Asia than in Europe before 
inflecting after 1750. Indeed in the centuries before that, European population grew 
at only 0.3 to 0.4 percent per year and maintained a stable 20 percent of the world 
population total. At the same time, Asian population grew at 0.6 percent a year, and 
even faster in China and India, so that the Asian share of the world total rose from 
60 to 66 percent. However, the Asian population was not only much larger and 
faster growing. To support its faster growing population, Asia also was able to 
produce more and more productively. Indeed, in 1750 Asia's 66 percent share of 
the world's population produced 80 percent of the world's GNP, while Europe's 20 
percent of population produced less than the remaining 20 percent of world output, 
since Africa and the Americas also contributed to the same -- and to European GNP 
itself. Per capita income in Asia and especially in China was also higher than in 
Europe (Bairoch 1981, Frank 1998).  
  
Europe's disadvantaged position in the world economy was partly compensated by 
its privileged access to American money. On the demand side, the use of their 
American money - and only that - permitted the Europeans to enter into and then 
increase their market share in the world market, all of whose dynamic centers were 
in Asia. On the supply side, access to and use of cheap - to the Europeans virtually 
free - money in the Americas afforded the wherewithal to acquire the supplies of 
real consumption and investment goods world-wide: servile labor and materials in 
the Americas to dig up the silver in the first place; slave labor from Africa; and 
from a European perspective virgin soil and climate also in the Americas. These 
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resources were used to produce sugar, tobacco, timber for ships and other export 
crops later including especially cotton at low cost for European consumption. West 
European imports via the Baltic Sea of grain, timber, and iron from eastern and 
northern Europe was also paid for with American money and some textiles. And of 
course their American supplied money was the only means of payment that 
permitted Europeans to import all those famed Asian spices, silks, cotton textiles 
and other real goods for their own consumption and also for re-export to the 
Americas and Africa. Asians produced these goods and sold them to Europeans 
only for their American supplied silver. That is, all these real goods that were 
produced by non-Europeans became cheaply, indeed nearly freely, available to 
Europeans; because they had and were able to pay for them with their American 
supplied money. Indeed, this silver - also produced by non-Europeans - was the 
only export good that the Europeans were able to bring to the world market. 
 
Additionally moreover, this supply of goods produced by labor and raw materials 
outside of Europe also replaced and freed alternative resources for other uses 
within Europe: American sugar and Atlantic cod fish supplied calories for 
consumption for which Europe did not have to use their own farmland; Asian 
cotton textiles supplied clothes for which to European consumers and producers did 
not have to use wool from European sheep that would have eaten European grass. 
Otherwise, that grass would in turn have had to be produced on still more 
enclosures of land for even more 'sheep to eat [some] men' so as to produce still 
more wool to clothe others. Thus, the import of Asian textiles with American 
money indirectly also permitted Europeans to produce more food and timber in 
Western Europe itself. Thus, Europeans were able to use their position in the world 
economy both to supplement its own supplies and resources by drawing directly on 
those from the Americas to the west and Eastern Europe and Asia to the east. The 
supply of these additional resources to Europe from the outside also freed European 
resources for use in its own development. 
 
So the turn of the eighteenth century was not marked by Europe's alleged absolute 
or relative development nor by any Asian 'traditional' backwardness or stagnation. 
On the contrary and perhaps paradoxically, it was Asia's economic development 
and Europe's backwardness that set the stage for the simultaneous cyclical "Decline 
of the East" and "Rise of the West." Europe's still productive backwardness may 
have offered some of the "advantages" to catch up, discussed by Gerschenkron 
(1962). Europe's backwardness incentivated and its supply of American money 
permitted Europeans to pursue micro- and macro-economic advantages, which 
were to be had from increased European participation in the expanding Asian 
economies from 1500 to 1800. The roots of the post 1800 "Rise of the West" and 
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"Decline of the East" can and must be accounted for in WORLD-wide economic 
and demographic terms, in which the economies of Asia played a major role.  
A WORLD DEMOGRAPHIC/ ECONOMIC/ ECOLOGICAL EXPLANATION 
OF THE DECLINE OF THE EAST AND THE RISE OF THE WEST 
My explanation has three related parts. A combination of demographic and micro-
/macro-economic analysis identifies an inflection of population and economic 
productivity growth rates that led to an "exchange" of places between Asia and 
Europe in the world economy/system between 1750 and 1850. Microeconomic 
analysis of world-wide supply-and-demand relations and relative economic and 
ecological factor prices can show how they generated incentives for labor and 
capital saving and energy producing invention, investment and innovation, which 
took place in Europe. On the other hand, macroeconomic analysis of cyclical 
distribution of income and derivative effective demand and supply in Asia 
illuminate the opportunity to do so profitably in world economic terms.  
 
This summary explanation of the related "Decline of the East" and "Rise of the 
West" may be briefly elaborated as follows: The simple hypothesis is that 
technological innovations were a function of demand and supply and of relative 
factor prices of inputs like labor, capital, and land. Therefore it was primarily the 
higher wages and relatively abundant capital in Europe that eventually generated 
labor saving and energy producing technology. This argument may be challenged 
by the observation  [e.g. by Pomeranz 1997] that the "industrial revolution" was 
less labor "saving" than labor "extending" and that it increased the productivity of 
both labor and capital. Direct wage rates or costs may also have been as high [or 
even higher] in some parts of China, e.g. in the Yangtze Valley and the South, 
though probably not anywhere in India, than in some parts of Europe, especially 
England. 
 
An unequal distribution of income generates luxury and import demand at the top 
and a large supply of cheap labor at the bottom. I contended that this was the case 
more so, and Pomeranz (1997) that it was not so, in China than in Europe, although 
we agree that it probably was more unequal than either in India. Additional 
research on these questions is being done by Barendse (1998) and by Pan (1998).  
But the problem of absolute, relative and world wide comparative wage costs - in 
entrepreneurial calculation as in our analysis of the same - is related also to local 
and regional problems of labor allocation. And there were some economic 
differences in labor allocation especially between agriculture and industry, which 
were related to some institutional differences. However, it is less clear to what 
extent these differences were underlying causes or of the observed allocation of 
labor or whether they were only different institutional mechanisms through which 
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the labor allocation were organized. Particularly important differences were: A. 
Bonded labor in India (Pomeranz 1997). B. Women were tied to the village and 
their labor was restricted to agriculture and domestic industry, e.g. spinning, in 
China (Goldstone 1996). C. Some industrial workers could still draw directly on 
some subsistence goods produced by women-village-agriculture in China but less 
so in England without having to acquire these through the market (Pomeranz 1997). 
D. Enclosures [to produce more cheaper wool for textiles on more land - "sheep ate 
men"] expulsed male and female labor from the land into urban un/employment in 
England [and elsewhere in Europe?].  
 
The industrial "revolution" was initiated with cotton textiles, but these required 
both a growing "external" supply of cotton [for Europe - from its colonies] and a 
"world" market for all in which everybody had to compete [except China, which 
still had a growing and protected domestic and regional market]. The industrial 
"revolution" also required and took place in the supply and production of more and 
cheaper energy, especially through coal and its use in making and using machinery 
to generate steam power, first stationary and then also mobile. The critical role of 
coal and its replacement of wood as a source of fuel in Britain is demonstrated by 
Wrigley (1994). These sources of power technically and economically first required 
[and permitted] concentration of labor and capital in mining, transport, and 
production. Then they also permitted faster and cheaper long distance transport via 
steam powered railway and shipping. 
 
Investment in such "revolutionary" industrial power, equipment, organization and 
the labor necessary to make them work was undertaken wherever, but also only 
where, it was economically rational and possible to do so, in terms of A. Labor 
allocation and cost alternatives; B. Location and comparative costs of other 
productive inputs [eg. timber/coal/animal/human sources of power and transport, as 
well as raw materials like cotton and iron], which were related to the geographical 
location of these resources and to ecological changes in their availability; C. capital 
availability and alternative profitable uses; and D. Market penetration and potential. 
 
At the turn of the eighteenth-nineteenth centuries the above mentioned factors in 
world economic competitive and comparative circumstances, changes, and 
transformation generated the following results:  
 
- India continued but was threatened in its competitive dominance on the world 
textile market on the basis of cheap and also bonded skilled labor. Domestic 
supplies of cotton, food and other wage goods continued to be ample and cheap; 
and productive, trade and financial organization and transport remained relatively 
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efficient despite suffering from increasing economic and political difficulties. 
However, supplies of alternative power and materials, e.g. from coal and iron/steel, 
were relatively scarce and expensive. Therefore, Indians had little economically 
rational incentive to invest in innovations at this time. They were further impeded 
from doing so first by economic decline beginning already in the second quarter of 
the eighteenth century or earlier; then by the [resulting?] decline in population 
growth and British colonialism from the third quarter onwards; and finally from a 
combination of both decline and colonialism as well as "Drain" of capital from 
India to Britain.  India switched from being a net exporter to being a net importer of 
cotton textiles in 1816. However India did continue to struggle on the textile 
market and began again to increase textile production - by then also in factories - 
and exports in the last third of the nineteenth century.   
  
- China still retained its world market dominance in ceramics, partially in silk and 
increasingly in tea, and remained substantially self-sufficient in textiles. China's 
balance of trade and payments surplus continued into the early nineteenth century. 
Therefore China had availability and concentration of capital from both domestic 
and foreign sources. However, China's natural deposits of coal were distant from its 
possible utilization for the generation and industrial use of power, so that 
progressive deforestation still did not make it economical to switch from wood to 
coal for fuel. Moreover, transport via inland canals and coastal shipping, as well as 
by road, remained efficient and cheap [but not from outlying coal deposits].  
 
This economic efficiency and competitiveness of the Chinese on both domestic and 
world markets also rested on absolutely and comparatively cheap labor costs. Even 
if per-capita income was higher than elsewhere, as Bairoch notes, and its 
distribution was no more unequal than elsewhere [as Pomeranz and Goldstone 
claim], the wage good cost of production was low, both absolutely and relatively. 
Labor was abundant for agriculture and industry, and agricultural products were 
cheaply available also for industrial workers and therefore to their employers, who 
could pay their workers low subsistence wages.  Goldstone (1996) emphasizes one 
reason: Women were tied to the villages and therefore remained available for 
[cheap] agricultural production. Pomeranz (1997) emphasizes a related reason: 
Urban industrial workers were still able to draw for part of their subsistence on 
"their" villages, which was produced cheaply in part by the women to whom 
Goldstone refers. In other words from an entrepreneurial industrial employer and 
market perspective, wage goods were absolutely and relative cheap; because 
agriculture produced them efficiently and cheaply also with female labor. The 
"institutional" distribution of cheap food to urban and other workers in industry, 
transport, trade and other services was functionally equivalent to what it would also 
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have been if the functional distribution of income had been MORE unequal than it 
was.  The availability of labor was high, its supply price low, its demand for 
consumer goods attenuated; and there was little incentive to invest in labor saving 
or alternative energy using production or transport. Elvin (1973) sought to 
summarize such circumstances in his "equilibrium trap." Even so, China still 
remained competitive on the world market and maintained its export surplus. 
Emperor Ch'ien Lung said in his 1793 message to King George III of England "I 
set no value on objects strange and ingenious and have no use for your country's 
manufactures" (Schurman and Schell 1967, I: 108-109). 
 
- Western Europe and particularly Britain were hard put to compete especially with 
India and China. Europe was still dependent on India for cotton textiles and on 
China for ceramics and silks that Europe re-exported and from which it profited in 
its [economic and/or political] colonies in Africa and the Americas. Moreover, 
Europe remained dependent on its colonies for most of the money it needed to pay 
for these imports, both for re-export and for its own consumption and other use, 
e.g., as inputs for its own production and export. In the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, there was a decline in the marginal if not also the absolute 
inflow of precious metals and other profits through the slave trade and plantations 
from the European colonies in Africa and the Americas. To recoup and even to 
maintain - never mind to increase - its [world and even domestic] market share 
Europeans collectively and its entrepreneurs individually had to attempt to increase 
their penetration of at least some markets, and to do so either by eliminating 
competition politically/militarily or by undercutting it by lowering its own costs of 
production, or both. 
 
Opportunity to do so knocked when the "Decline" began in India and West Asia, if 
not yet in China. Wage and other costs of production and transport were still 
uncompetitively high in Britain and elsewhere in Europe. However especially after 
1750, rising incomes and declining mortality rates sharply increased the rate and 
amount of population growth.  Moreover, the displacement of surplus labor from 
agriculture increased its potential supply to industry. At the same time, the 
imposition of British colonialism on India reversed the perennial capital outflow to 
India and turned it into "The Drain" from India and into Britain. Moreover, a 
combination of commercial and colonial measures would permit the import of 
much more raw cotton to Britain and Western Europe. Deforestation and ever 
scarcer supplies of wood and charcoal and rendered these more expensive.  
 
At the same time since the second third of the eighteenth century, first relative and 
then absolute declines in the cost of coal made the replacement of charcoal [and 
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peat] by hard coal increasingly economical and then common in Britain. The 
Kondratieff B phase in the last third of the eighteenth century generated 
technological inventions and improvements in textile manufacturing and steam 
engines [first to pump water out of coal pits and then also to supply motive power 
to the textile industry]. At the turn of the eighteenth-nineteenth centuries, the "first” 
A phase [identified by Kondratieff] and the Napoleonic wars generated increased 
investment in and the expansion of these new productive facilities and then also of 
transport equipment. Ever more of the available but still relatively high cost labor 
force was incorporated into the "factory system." Production increased rapidly; real 
wages and income declined; and "the workshop of the world” conquered ever more 
foreign markets through "free trade." Yet even then, British colonialism had to 
prohibit free trade to India and recurred to the export of its opium to force an "Open 
Door" into China. 
 
- Most other parts of the world still fall through the cracks of our world economic 
analysis. Yet in brief, we can observe that most of Africa may have had labor/land 
ratios at least as favorable to labor saving investment as Europe. However Africa 
did not have an analogous resource base [except the still undeveloped one in 
Southern Africa], and far from having a capital inflow, Africa suffered from capital 
outflow. The same was true of the Caribbean. Latin America had resources and 
labor, but also suffered from colonial and neo-colonial capital outflow as well as 
specialization in raw materials exports, while its domestic markets were captured 
by European exports.  West, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia became increasingly 
captive markets for if not also colonies of Europe and its industry, to which they 
supplied the raw materials that they had previously themselves processed for 
domestic consumption and export.  In the nineteenth century, only the European 
"settler colonies" in North America, Australasia, Argentina, and Southern Africa 
were able to find other places in the international division of labor, and China and 
Japan were able to continue offering significant resistance.  
 
In short, changing world demographic/ economic/ ecological circumstances 
suddenly - and for most people including Adam Smith unexpectedly - made a 
number of related investments economically rational and profitable: in machinery 
and processes that saved labor input per unit of output, thus increasing the 
productivity and use of labor and its total output; increasing productive power 
generation; and increasingly productive employment and productivity of capital.  
This transformation of the productive process was initially concentrated in selected 
industrial, agricultural, and service sectors in those parts of the world economy 
whose comparative competitive POSITION made -- and then continually re-made -
- such Newly Industrializing Economies [NIE] import substituting and export 
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promoting measures economically rational and politically possible. Thus, this 
transformation was and continues to be only a temporally localized and still 
shifting manifestation of a WORLD economic process, even if it is not spread 
uniformly around the world -- as historically nothing ever has been and still is not 
likely. But that is another - later - story, which will lead to the Re-emergence of 
East Asia in the world economy today. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS  
Received theory attributes the industrial revolution and the "rise" of the West to its 
alleged "exceptionality" and "superiority." The source of the same is sought in turn 
in the also alleged long-standing or even primeval Western preparation for take-off. 
This contention mistakes the place and misplaces the "concreteness" of the 
transformation by looking for it in Europe itself. Yet the "causes" of the 
transformation can never be understood as long as they are examined only under 
the European streetlight and must instead be sought under the world-wide global 
illumination in the system as a whole.  That turns all received theory on its head. 
 
The argument - and the evidence! - is that world development between 1400 and 
1800 reflects not Asia's weakness but its strength, and not Europe's nonexistent 
strength but rather its relative weakness in the global economy. For it was all these 
regions' joint participation and place in the single but unequally structured and 
unevenly changing global economy that resulted also in changes in their relative 
positions in the world. The common global economic expansion since 1400 long 
benefited the Asian centers earlier and more than marginal Europe, Africa, and the 
Americas. However, this very economic benefit turned into a growing absolute and 
relative disadvantage for one Asian region after another in the late eighteenth 
century. Production and trade began to atrophy as growing population and income, 
but also their economic and social polarization, exerted pressure on resources, 
constrained effective demand at the bottom, and increased the availability of cheap 
labor in Asia more than elsewhere in the world. That world economic change also 
opened the door to the "Rise of the West,' which must be re-examined in terms the 
more important global historical continuity instead of any and all its dis-
continuities. The perception of a major new departure in 1500, which allegedly 
spells a dis-continuous break in world history, is substantially [mis] informed by a 
Eurocentric vantage point. Once we abandon this Eurocentrism and adopt a more 
globally holistic world or even pan-EurAsian perspective, dis-continuity is 
replaced by far more continuity.  Or the other way around? Once we look upon the 
whole world more holistically, historical continuity looms much larger, especially 
in Asia. Indeed, the very "Rise of the West" itself then appears derived from this 
global historical continuity.  
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East Asia's renewed rise to world economic prominence makes it all the more 
urgent to focus on the long historical continuity of which this process is a part.  
Decolonization began in South Asia with independence in India in 1948, liberation 
in China in 1949 and then in Indonesia and elsewhere in Southeast Asia marked a 
political beginning of this renewed shift. And only a half century later the 1997 
return of Hong Kong to China heralded the completion of another 360 degrees 
round the world global shift. Economically, it began in industrialization in China 
including Taiwan and in Japan and then Korea, but also included Hong Kong and 
Singapore among the first set of the East Asian NIEs or "four tigers." Since then, 
revived economic growth has been spreading also to other "tigers" or "little 
dragons" elsewhere in Southeast Asia and to the "BIG Dragon" on the China coast. 
That is the same South [and East] China Sea region, also with its "overseas 
Chinese" diaspora, which had been so prominent in the world economy in the 
previous long political economic phase of expansion from the fifteenth through the 
eighteenth centuries.  
 
The now supposed dis-continuous but really renewed rise of the "East" must be 
seen as part and parcel of the fundamental structure and continuity in global 
development. Recognizing and analyzing this continuity will reveal much more 
than myopically focusing on the alleged dis-continuities, like the newly discovered 
"globalization" and "new emergence of the East" of the 1990's, or indeed also like 
the wholesale misinterpretation that already sees a renewed "meltdown" in 1997. 
The widely mis-interpreted 1998 'meltdown' of East Asia is a largely but not 
entirely financial symptom of the renewed reality of the growing importance of 
East Asian productive capacity, market demand, and finance in the world economy: 
This is the first world recession again to begin in East Asia and spread from there 
to the West, instead of vice versa. That marked the beginnings of the return back 
360 degrees around the world of the world economic center to Asia where it had 
always been before the already past period of temporary Western ascendance. 
 
Thus, the contemporary economic expansion in East Asia may spell the beginnings 
of a return of Asia to a leading role in the world economy in the future as it had in 
the not so distant past -- with 'Middle Kingdom' China again at its 'center'.  
Wertheim (1997:169) recalls that the Dutch historian Jan Romein (1962) already 
called The Asian Century and predicted that in two or three decades China would 
become an industrial nation and rise to become the greatest power in the East if not 
the world.  
  
These contemporary developments and future prospects demand new and better 
historiography and social theory to comprehend them and to offer at least some 
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modest guide to social policy and action. ReORIENT: GLOBAL ECONOMY IN 
THE ASIAN AGE  (Frank 1998) is intended as another step in that direction. 
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